By Cheryl Misak
Cheryl Misak bargains a strikingly new view of the reception of yank pragmatism in England. Supposedly it by no means recovered from the assaults of Russell and Moore; yet Misak indicates that Frank Ramsey, less than the impression of Peirce, built a pragmatist place of serious promise, and that he transmitted that pragmatism to his buddy Wittgenstein.
summary: Cheryl Misak deals a strikingly new view of the reception of yankee pragmatism in England. Supposedly it by no means recovered from the assaults of Russell and Moore; yet Misak exhibits that Frank Ramsey, lower than the impression of Peirce, constructed a pragmatist place of serious promise, and that he transmitted that pragmatism to his pal Wittgenstein
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Additional info for Cambridge pragmatism : from Peirce and James to Ramsey and Wittgenstein
This is another way in which Peirce’s pragmatism is distinguished from that of the strong behaviourists, who want to drop all reference to inner subjective states. Peirce (and, we shall see, Ramsey8) thought the theory of belief requires both. It requires inner states (such as mental awareness with a certain qualitative character) as well as external states (such as publicly observable behaviour), even if the pragmatist is going to emphasize the latter. Thus Peirce is not open to a problem associated with many 8 It is not clear whether Ramsey had access to the two passages of Peirce’s quoted directly above.
57, 1893] We are now in a position to see why pragmatism is ‘scarcely more than a corollary’ of the connection Bain draws between belief and action. While Peirce did not accept the metaphysics of mind that some dispositionalists adopt, he did maintain that we believe, judge, and assert a proposition only if we are disposed to act on it. The disposition to act is necessary, just as it is necessary, on Peirce’s view, that a belief must have practical consequences for it to have content. As we shall see, Peirce thought a belief ’s consequences for action are central not only to constituting it but also to determining its normative status.
Peirce focused on one or another of these four things as he modified the maxim and as he tried to articulate it within different contexts—for instance, his theory of signs, his logic, his theory of probability, and so on. While Peirce’s later amendments never saw a lot of daylight, the careful reader could get much of what Peirce intended from ‘How to Make Our Ideas Clear’. In that paper, Peirce’s aim is to tell us what we need to do to arrive at clear concepts. He takes himself to be making an important contribution to an old debate.
Cambridge pragmatism : from Peirce and James to Ramsey and Wittgenstein by Cheryl Misak